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1. HE YEAR 1971 was one of economic recovery
from the 1969-70 recession and moderate progress in
the battle against inflation. Yet, because these improve-
ments were less than deemed attainable, the country
turned to a new economic stablization program in
which centralized controls played a dominant role.
Most measures of activity reflect a pronounced
improvement from the recession and strike-depressed
conditions of late 1970. Total spending on goods and
services has risen about 9 percent during 1971, up
from both the 4.3 percent increase during 1970 and a
growth trend of 6.3 percent from 1957 to 1970. Real
output expanded about 5 percent in the year, after
declining slightly in 1970 and rising at a 3.7 percent
trend rate from 1957 to 1970. Some improvement was
also made with respect to inflation even before iinpo-
sition of the freeze. Overall prices, as measured by
the UN-P deflator, rose at a 4.7 percent annual rate in
the first half of 1971, down from the 5.7 percent in-
crease in 1970. This was the first significant reduction
in the pace of inflation since it began in 1965.
Despite the economic gains, which were roughly in
line with most projections at the beginning of the year,
the performance of the economy was generally con-
sidered unsatisfactory. The public had been led
to expect niore employment and a slower pace of
inflation. The President’s Economic Report at the be-
ginning of the year projected much sharper rises in
spending and production as well as more improvement
with respect to inflation than actually occurred. The
financial press often compared current performance
with goals of full employment and relatively stable
prices, without regard to their attainability in the short
run. Unemployment, averaging 6 percent of the labor






In \ iex of the high aspirations for the economy in
such a short time period, frustration over the trend of
dc -~ lopmcnts became widespread. Many were led to
believe that fiscal and monetary actions had become
lmrgely impotent in the face of the power of big busi-
nesses and major labor unions to administer prices and
wages. Institutional relationships seemed to have
undergone a major transformation, especially to those
who had advocated the tolerance of inflation in order
to assure high employment.
Because of the slow progress in real economic
expansion and the continued inflation, as well as a
deteriorating balance-of-payments situation,the nation
adopted a new economic program in mid-August.
Among other things, the program was designed to
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Largely overlooked in the analysis of 1971 was the
influence of trends of activity and stabilization actions
taken in the imnlediatelv preceding years. These ele-
ments go a long way toward explaining the alleged
failure of traditional stabilization actions to stimulate
employment and reduce the pacc’ of inflation. In this
review of the year 1971, discussion is first devoted to
these earlier developments. Particular emphasis is
placed on the inflation problem since it had been de-
veloping for a relatively long period, and since both
the underutilization of resources and the imposition of
wage and price controls are related to attempts to
resist this inflation. F’inallv. after examining economic
developments of 1971, the outlook for 1972 is discussed.
The Problem: Inflation
A major economic problem of 1971 has been the
persistence of a strong inflation. Inflation is~~~t rise in
the average level of prices of goods and services. As
the prices of goods and services rise, the purchasing
power of money, bonds, savings accounts and other
money—denominated assets falls. An unanticipated
change in relative values of money denominated assets
and other assets causes unplanned wealth transfers.
The Wealth- Transfer Effects of Inflation
Losses, and offsetting gains, caused by an unexpec-
ted change in prices can he illustrated by reviewing the
experience of bind holders. A buyer of a typical 20—
year highest grade corporate bond in early 1965 re-
ceived a coupon yield of about 4.5 percent per year.
Since overall prices hail risen on average at less than
1.5 percent per year for about eight years previous to
that time, the buyer of the bond could reasonably
expect a3percent real return on his investment (4.5
percent coupon reduced by about a 1.5 percent rise
in prices) Inflation, however, turned out to he much
greater than buyers of bonds anticipated. Assuming
the bond was sold after five years (that is, in early
1970), the experienced real return turned out to be a
negative 4 percent per year. Not only did the returned
principal and interest buy less in 1970 than in 1965,
but because the market in 1970 was expecting a
greater future inflation, the required higher nominal
return to get the desired real return caused the dollar
price of the bond to fall about 25 percent. The issuers
of bonds, on the other hand, receive a great windfall
when repayment is made in depreciated dollars.
An individual who retired on a pension or bought a
life annuity in 1965 found that the income received in
mid—l9el would buy only 77 percent as much as in
1965. Based on the 1953 to 1965 experience, he might
have expected in 1965 that the purchasing power
would he about 91. percent in 1971. Elderly people
dependent on pensions or annuity income are at a par-
ticular disadvantage during a period of accelerating
inflation. Opportunities for them to hedge against the
inflation are few, and those available may present
additional financial risk.
i’he current inflation is likely to have redistribution
effects on real income and wealth for a long time.
Considerable experience is necessary to make relatively
accurate forecasts of future inflation. For everyone to
correctly anticipate inflation and make the proper
hedge in all contracts and other dealings is virtually
impossible.
Course a.nd Causes of Inflation
From 1958 through 1964, there was little inflation in
this country. After 1964, the rate of increase in prices
gradually accelerated until late 1969 and early 1970,
when overall price rises crested at a 5.8 percent annual
rate. From the first to the fourth quarter of 1970 prices
increased at a 5.4 percent rate, and in 1971, before the
freeze, prices rose at a 4.7 percent rate. Since the
freeze was announced in mid-August, prices have risen
less rapidly than they did earlier in the year.
Market power. Some attribute the inflation to the
ability of unions and other sellers of productive re-
sources to make effective exorbitant demands, It is
asserted that businesses, also with some power to
administer prices, seem reluctant to resist such de—
mands, passing on the rising costs with a mark—up in
prices to the consumer. A spiral is generated as labor
seeks still higher wages to compensate for rising living
costs. This market po\ver explanation of inflation
appeals to many observers, although labor and man-
agement naturally disagree as to xvhich group triggered
the spiral.
To he consistent with recent inflationary experience,
the market power explanation of the recent inflation
assumes that resource owners gradually became more
powerful from 1964 to early 1970, and have since be-
come less powerful. This is unlikely, but in addition,
lnarket power as an explanation of a large overall price
increase is incomplete. Admittedly, some unions and
businesses have power to raise their wages or prices
considerabl above the competitive equilibrium levels.
However, as long as total spending remains un-
changed, the higher prices for some items indicates
either offsetting lower prices for some others, or \vhat
is more likely in view of the downward rigidity of
many prices, lower sales, production, and employment.
Hence, market power or cost-push, unless acconi-
panied by greater total spending, is a better explana-
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tion of unemployment and idle plants than it is of
inflation.
Demand-pull. Another explanation of inflation con-
centrates on excessive total spending; that is, “too
many dollars chasing too few goods.” Yet, do business-
men readily raise prices as soon as the demand for
their products strengthens, as in the case when goods
are auctioned? Most businesses will sell all the
merchandise available at the going price. Mark—ups
typically occur when wagesare increased or when
costs of goods sold rise. Critics of this view point out
that if higher prices are a response to excessive de-
mand, why has there been a continued rise in overall
prices since early 1970 when some workers and
factories have remained idle?
The demand-pull effect on prices from excessive
spending is not immediate, however, as illustrated by
examining pricing policies in a fictitious \vidget line.
As consumers spend more on widgets, as well as on
other goods and services, retailers are willing to
reduce their inventories temporarily at going prices,
since their knowledge of demand and supply schedules
is imperfect and cannot he quickly improved at a
reasonable cost. Orders are placed with wholesalers
for more widgets, who in turn, reduce their stocks
usually without a price markup. Wholesalers increase
their orders with manufacturers, and mnore widgets
are produced at going prices. I-Iowever, once produc-
tion orders rise to the point where the cost of resources
is bid up in order to fill these requests. costs of pro-
clueing widgets increase. These costs then are passed
back up the line, not only directly in the form of
higher widget prices, but also indirectly through the
entire economy by bidding up the prices of labor,
materials, and land.
This illustration of the inflation process, which treats
excessive demand as the key determinant, may explain
wh many business firms believe inflation begms with
a rise in costs. Also, since information on changes in
production costs and demand schedules is imperfect
and expensive to improve in the short run, the rate of
price increase may accelerate only slowly at first, even
under intense total demand and product shortages.
Conversely, prices are likely to continue working up
long after the excessive demand pressure is removed
and slack develops in the productiomr process. Time
lags between changes in demand and in prices are,
of course, lengthened with monopolistic power and
long—term contracts. The phenomenon known as cost-
push inflation is usually the latter stages of a demnand-
induced inflation. The time lag reflects the high costs
of moving to equilibrium prices more rapidly.
L:ontrthntions to Excessive Total Spending
Total spending on goods and services rose at a rate
roughly double the pace of productive capacity from
late 1964 to the fall of 1969. What caused spending
to rise so rapidly in this period? In our free enterprise
system, each household and business firm has the
choice to spend or save the funds received. Hence,
the rise in total spending might be viewed as a bunch-
ing of a great many expansionary decisions. More
spending units made greater outlays than ever before.
What was the causal force behind the surge in
spending in the 1964-69 period? Analysts generally
focus on fiscal actions (taxing and spending decisions
h-v the Federal Government) and monetary actions
(managing the nation’s money supply). These actions,
which are believed to influence total spending, are
under control of public policy and can he managed.
Fiscal actions. Fiscal actions of the Government may
not have much enduring effect on changes in total
spending. Empirical studies at this Bank using stan-
dard measures of fiscal actions have indicated little
lasting influence of moderate changes in Government
expenditures on the trends of total spending, hut
sharply accelerating Government outlays may have
important short-run effects. Deficits created by cuts in
tax rates or increases in Government outlays must he
financed by an expansion in Government debt. Such
borrowing has tended to cause offsetting movements
in private spending (unless accompanied by a change
in the money stock). Government fiscal actions may
affect income distribution and real growth rates, hut
have a relatively minor affect on tile time path of total
spending. Fiscal actions were a factor, but they alone
should not be credited for causing tile large and pro-
longed burst of spending in the 1964-69 period.
Government outlays increased rapidly in 1965 and
1966 in response to both the build-up for Vietnam and
an expansion in nondefense expenditures. The large
spending for these activities may have had some direct
effect on the initial rise in total spending in 1965 and
1966. The potency of Government spending in affect-
ing total spending, however, was seriously questioned
when in late 1966 and early 1967 total spending hesi-
tated, even though fiscal actions were the most ex-
pansive in over a decade. A second test came in late
1963. As a result of the 10 percent surtax and cutbacks
in the growth of Federal spending, a marked slow-
down in total spemrding was forecast for late 1968 or
early 1969. Yet, spending continued to rise rapidly,
and tire pace of inflation intensified.
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Monetary actions. A marked variation in the rate of
change in money from a previous trend which is sus-
tained for several quarters, by contrast, has almost
alwas been followed by a simnilar change in the
growth of total spending.’ The trend growth of money
has apparently been a major force in the trend of
overall prices.
Money stock rose at a 5.2 percent anmluai rate from
mid-1964 to April 1966, after rising at a 2 percent
trend rate from 1957 to 1964. The greater Treasury
borrowing plus a reluctamaee to permit sharp upward
movements in interest rates probably contributed
‘In ‘Money Supply and Time Deposits, 1914-69,” this Review
March 1970), pp. 6—10, money ~owth rates arid cyclical
movements in economic activity, as determined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, were compared. The record
clearly indicates that marked and sustained changes in the
rates of growth of money were usually followed after a brief
lag by cyclical mnovements in business activity in the same
dimmectiomi.
greatly to the faster money growth. After a brief time
lag, total spending on goods and services also acceler-
ated. Money remained on a plateau from April 1966 to
early 1967, and with a similar lag, there was a brief
pause in the upward thrust of total spending from late
1966 to mid-1967, called the mini-recession. From
early 1967 to early 1969 money again rose at a very
rapid 7.6 percent rate, and from mid-1967 to the fall
of 1969 total spending rose correspondingly, and infla-
tion intensified.
Sta.tnazatvon AL. i.O~.fl5 10. .I&’69 ~/a•~a•
In an attempt to reduce the inflationary upsurge,
both fiscal and monetary actions beeamne less expan-
sionary in 1969. Reflecting the effects of the Revenue
and Expenditure Control Act of mid-1968, which in-
eluded a 10 percent surtax and cuts in Federal spend-
ing. the high-employment budget moved from a deficit
of $7 billion in 1968 to a surplus of $11 billion in 1969.
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Growth in the money stock was slowed from the 7.6
percent rate of the previous two years to a 3 percent
rate from early 1969 to early 1970, approximately
equal to the trend since 1957. Control of monetary
expansion was facilitated by the reduced financing
demands of the Treasury.
Beginning in the fall of 1969, or about six mnonths
after tile reduction in the growth rate of mnommey,
growth in total spending siowed fromn the excessive
8.3 percent rate to a more moderate 4.1 percent pace,
a rate approximating the growth in productive capa-
city. Despite the moderation of total spending growth,
the upward surge of prices continued to accelerate in
1969, probably as a lagged result of earlier excessive
spending. Effective real demand slowed, and real pro-
duction remained almnost unchamigedin late 1969.
Early in 1970 the traditional policies of economic
stabilization became mnore expansive. Fiscal actions be-
came slightly more stimulative as the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 reduced personal tax liabilities on balance.
The surplus in time high-employment budget declined
from $11 billion in 1969 to $7 billion in 1970. Fromn
February 1970 to January 1971, the money stock rose
at a 5.5 percent ammual rate. historically, this was a
rapid rate. During the Fifties and early Sixties, such
a growth of money, if long maintained, tended to
cause accelerating inflation. Ho\vever, with strong in-
flationary expectations in 1970, which could not be
quickly eluninated, spending could be permnittecl to
expand faster thami the gro\vth of productive capacity
and still place some downward pressure on prices. By
temporarily permnitting a faster growth in total spend-
ing, transition costs in terms of unemployment and lost
production were expected to be kept at muore moderate
levels.
Gro\vth in total outlays on goods and services
remained moderate during 1970. In time first half of
the year. spending svas probably greatly affected by
the slower rate of monetary expansion in 1969. In the
second half of 1970, expansive effects of the snore
rapid monetary expansion km the year were temporarily
thwarted by cutbacks in the production of war goods
and by a large strike in the automobile industry.
The peak of tire inflation was reached in early 1970,
and the rate of price advance began a very slow
retreat. The moderate growth in spending and a eomm—
tinned rapid rate of price advance eomnhined to cause
somue cutbacks imi total real output. The period from
late 1969 to late 1970 was labelled a recession, but
even with interruptions to production induced by a
large strike, it was one of tile mildest on record. Late
km 1970 activity began expanding, and as 1971 began,
itnsiness Conditions
Both fiscal and monetary developments had stimnu-
lative effects on business activity during the first seven
and a half months of 1971. The high-employment
budget, which measures discretionary fiscal actions,
remnained near the $7 billion surplus rate of the pre-
vious year. 1-lowever, because Government receipts
and expenditures are also greatly affected by cyclical
changes in the economy, the Government may have
had expansive “automnatic stabilizer” effects. Economic
activity was depressed in late 1969 and early 1970,
amid tax revenue declined markedly. The deficit in the
national income accounts budget went from $14 bil-
lion in 1970 to nearly a $20 billion rate in the first
half of 1971. This larger deficit also increased Treasury
financimig demands, making control of the mnoney stock
muore difficult, especially in the late spring and sum-
mer when market interest rates were rising.
Monetary developments. ~~rlso had an expansive im-
pact on spending during the first seven and a half
months of 1971. Since monetary actions have usually
affected econoune activity with a lag distributed over
about five quarters, most of the monetary effect on
business activity in early 1971 probably resulted from
tire mnoderately expansive actions taken in 1970. The
rapid monetary expansion of early 1971 contributed
further to spending decisions in that period.
In addition, spending in early 1971 was greatly
bolstered by several special factors. During the auto-
mobile strike in late 1970 many outlays were delayed
and after the strike a great rebound in spending
occurred. ~~~ls(), in early 1971 purchases of steel were
reportedly increased in anticipation of a possible strike
in the summer of 1971.
Total outlays on goods and services rose at about
an 11 percent annual rate from late 1970 to mid-1971.
By comparison, spending had m-isen at a 4.1 percent
rate in the previous five quarters and at a 6.3 percent
trend rate fromn 1957 to 1970. Retail sales rose at a
10.6 percent rate fromn Decemnher 1970 to July, after
going up at a 2 percent rate in the previous two years.
The rise in spending in early 1971 was sizable, but
because of the non-recurring strike situations, the data
exaggerate the strength of tire underlying spending
trench.
Despite the pronounced expansion in spending in
time first half of 1971, economic activity seemed to be
the country was in the initial stage of an economic
recovery.
Situation Prior to the Freeze
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sluggish amid improving only sligirtly. The momentum
of inflation eroded only gradually, and continued to
absorb mnuch of the rise in spending. Prices rose at a
4.7 percent rate in tile first half of 1971, comnpared
with 5.7 percent in 1970. Although this was the first
marked rlecrease in the pace of imiflation sincetire surge
began in 1.965, tIre continued inflation was a great dis-
appointment to those expecting rapid imnprovement
with the economnic slack.
Then, too, the spending increases in early 1971 be-
gami fromn a very low level caused by both the recession
and a major strike. Real output rose at a 6.4 percent
amrnual rate in the first half of 1971, after declining
slightly in tire previous five quarters and increasing at
a 3.7 percent trend rate frour 1957 to 1970. As is
usually the case after a period of depressed activity,
the initial rise in output, although large, was accomn-
plished primarily by nmore extensive use of tire existing
employed workers and facilities. Industrial production
responded less to the rise in total spending than other
types of output. During tire summer there were reduc-
tions of steel inventories winch were previously
built-up as a hedge against a strike. lurports of goods
from foreign producers increased rapidly in the first
sevemi months of 1971, and accounted for a larger
share of total sales.
The volume of idle resources, which svas relatively
large, ehamrged little durimrg the pre-freeze period of
1971. Umreniployoieut comrtinued at about 6 percent of
the labor force, although amnong married mnemr it was
only 3.2 percent.
Moneta-nj Actions
Early in 1971 the rate of monetary expansion ac-
celerated again. From January 1971 to July of this
year the mmroney stock increased at ami 11.6 percent
annual rate, the fastest six month increase simmce
World War II. By comparison, money increased 5.4
percemrt in 1970.
Federal Reserve credit, the monetary base, and
mnemnber bamrk reserves also rose rapidly during the first
sevcmm mnonths of 1971. For examnple, Federal Reserve
crecht, whicir mueasures tire direct mnonetary actions of
tile Federal Reserve Systemn, rose at about a 15 percent
amrmrual rate from December 1970 to July 1971, or about
twice the rate in 1970 and about four timnes the rate
in 1969.
Tire rapid nronetary expamrsiomr in the first six
montirs of 1971 reflected a comnhination of factors.
Money growth Irad slowed in late 1970, and a catch—up
imicrease was desired in the first quarter of 1971. lire
Money Stock
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tmend rise in velocity of montv appeared to lre deceler-
ating suggesting that a somenlmat faster growtlr of
mnoney stock wouid he desimable. &dditional economic
stimulation also seemrredl appiopri ftc. Even through the
1969-70 recession had been halted and total spend-
ing was expanding rapidly, economic commentators
focused chiefly on the idle plant capacity, unemploy-
ment, and the apparent lack of progress in reducing
them. Inflation seemed less of a constraint on mone-
tary stimnulatiomi simice mrrany believed timat it would
dissipate relatively fast in view of the potential
competition from excess productive capacity. Interest
rates rose rapidly from mnicl-March to July, tire three-
nromith Treasury bill going from 3.30 percent to about
5.40 percent, and a fear developed that more re-
strictive credit conditions miglrt abort the fragile
recovery. Finally, some of tire increase late in the
period was probably accidental. Precise monetary
commtrol is imnpossihle in the very short run given tire
present institutional structure, especially when money
mnarket conditiomms are used as the operating indicator.




The impositiomr of a mrew economic stabilization pro—
grammr, commonly called tile “freeze” occurred with a
Presiclemrtial announcement on August 15, 1971. The
timne for action seemrredl appropriate. Gomicern over the
persisteirt lmigir level of unemriploynment and the hack of
progress imi reducing tire stubbormi inflation was intensi-
fieci b projectiomrs of mrrost ecomrometric models that
omniy moderate progress on either front would occur
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dlurimrg the next twelve mnomrths without dlramrratie
actiomi. Sonic felt tirat tire power of strong mmmrions amid
big husimresses to admrrimrister prices had so changed time
structure of the eeomromrry thrat traditional mrronetary amrd
fiscal actiomrs were imreffective, or at least operated too
slowly.
Also, dlurimrg tire sumnmner of 1971 business activity
seemrred to he imi a lull, caused in part by strikes’’and
redlnctiomis of excessive steel imiventom-ies, amid somrre
feared tire ecOmiomrry mmmighrt again mrrove into a recessiomi.
lmmdustrial prodhuetiomr, winch had risen at a 5.8 percent
amrmruai rate fromrr December 1970 to May of tins year,
was unehamiged in Jimmie amid declimied in both July amid
August. Payroll emnploynremrt followed a sinrrilar pattermi.
Timrrimrg drf tire aminounreememrt of the miew programrr,
Irowever, was prrrbably largely dictated by tire imrter-
mrational situation. Tire LI’S. balamrce of paymnemits with
otirer mratiomis had been dieterioratimig rapidly, amid some
pronrpt action becamue essential. The net liquidhty dlefl-
cit, whicir wasabout S3.8 hilihomi in 1970, rose to a
$10.2 billiomr amrmiuai rate imr tire first quarter of 1971,
amid further to a $22.9 hihlion rate in tire second
quarter.
Tire eeonomrric programrr was a mnew, broad, and direct
attack on tire major economrric ills facimig tire nation.
Imiflatiomr was attacked hya 90-day freeze on xvages
amrdl prices, followed by’ a hess rigid programrr of controls
imr Phase II. Stimnulus to the ecomromrry was to flow frour
proposed1 reductions imi excise taxes on automnobies,
increases imr persomial tax exemmrptions, amid an imivest—
mrremit tax credit. Imrtermiatiomial problenrs were handled,
at least temrrporariy, by “floating” the dollar amid by
imnrpositiou of a 10 percemrt surcharge omi imniports.
Tine mmew programnr relied heavily on dhirect comitrols
diver imrdividual pricing decisiomrs. Tins was a dramnatie
departure frommr tire traditional approach of reivimig
chiefly omr mrromretarv amrd fiscal actiomis for economnie
stabihzatiomr, winch had left tire terms of individual
pnees to market forces amid tire freedomn to barganr
lrv tIre parties imrvobved. Time immrpositiomi of controls
causedi dhstortiomrs simice some prices amid wages had
risemr while othem’s imi simmriiar eircumrrstanees had miot.
Lack of alrility to pass omr inigirer costs placedl mnanv
firmmrs imr a squeeze, wirile sommre eomitraets for lnigirer
wages amrdi prices were voided. Previous experience
with controls had imrdicated tirat tinev misaliocate
resources, hamper economic growtim, encourage quality
oleterioratiomi, require imrcrcasimrg costs to admrrimiister.
and mrray prove unenforceable, umrless supported by
sound fiscal and monetary actions.
Despite tire kmrown shortcomnings of comitrols, tirey’
were weleooredl by tire general public. Gonsumirers and
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busimresses, as well as tire Governmnent. sought quicker
rehef fromrr the high level of unemripioynremrt and the
comrtimiueol rise imr prices. Tire desire for a bold programrr
that prommrised rapid imrrprovermrent seemnedl to over—
wlmelmmm tine experience of previous comitrol efforts, Most
imidimviduals were wihng to) give up somrre of their free—
dommr as well as urake persomial finamicial sacrifices for
tIre benefit of a better ecomromnv, as long as otirers
were nrakiug simuihar sacrifices.
Tire eum’remit ecomiomrric progranr Iras a better poten-
tial for success tlramr urost previous efforts at wage and
pried’ comrtrois. Timrring of imnrpositiomr was mnuch better
tiramr imr previous efforts. Dowmiward pressure on prices
fromrr excess capacity had existed for several years, arid
tire rate of imrflatiomr was receding, although slowly.
Umremrrploymrremit was about to gradually erode in view
of the recovers’ of spemrdimig and! production. Also, with
tire relative slack, few shortages have developed, the
usual cause of mrrajor problemrrs in previous control
efforts. Imi aoldition, recent mironetary developments
lrave aideoi tire prorgranr by mrot adding to the under-
lying inflationary pressures.
Fiscal and uronetary actions alone could have cured
tlmo’ imrflatiomr amid unemrrploy’mrrent probiemnis, but, given
tire strong inrflatiomrary expectatiomrs, it might have
takemr several years. Controls may’ sirortemi the lags
lretween soumid stahrihzatiomr aetiomrs and! their effect on
price expectations amid employnrent. Also, Governmnent
comitrols could act as a coumitervailimrg power to some
of tire large nromroporhstic eiemnemrts imr society that tend
to prolong time mnomrrentmmm of imrflationr amrd generate
umremrrpioymnrent. To tire extemit that controls dor show
price increases, more of tire rise in spemrding ivmill he
focmmsedi on prodnmcticmi and enrpioymrremrt and less nviH
be dissipated in higher prices.
M.nm-.:~tarqDave aprncnts
Simree tire iirrposition of time freeze inn mnid—Angust the
mmromrey stock iras chamiged little. A temrrporary pause
imm mooney growtlr was probably olesirable in view of
the rapid spurt durimrg tire sprimrg amid early’ summer.
For tire past twelve mnromiths. mrrormey iras gronvn about
6.3 percemrt. Tins has been a rmnpid pace eourparedl witir
a .5.4 percemrt imrcrease imi 1970, amidl a 3.1 percent rise
in 1969. Federal Reserve credit, mmremrrber bamik reserves
amidi tire mrrOmietarv base, wiricir are the source of mrroney
ereatromi, iraye sirorwmr simrniiar pattermrs (if expamision.
Becamise of chamrged cormiditiomrs imi tire credit mrrarkets
the showing orf mrroney growth after mrrid-Ammgust was
accomnrplmsireo! at a timmie of gradual reduction in mnrarket
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dined fromn about 5.25 percent mi the first half of
August to 4.15 percent in early December. Yields on
iniglrest gradle seasomreol corporate bonds decreased
from 7.70 percent to 7.30 percent over the same period.
Both supplies and demnands for funds changed
substamitiahly after mnniol-August. To the extent that
borrowers amiol iemiders expected tine new programmm to
reduce future imifiation frommm what it mrnight have been
otherwise, tire imiterest rate premniunr for expected
inflation was lowereol. A sizable foreign diemamioi for
Governnremit securities oieveloped. reflecting the large
outflow of dhoiiars fronr this country before tire dollar
was floated. Also. businessnrnemi probably becamne mnore
cautious imi expammsion plans amid credit denrands during
time fall of tire year. Uncertaimity’ was great over what
rules would be adopted under Phase II of time New
Ecomromnmic Programrn amrdi how threse rules worulol be
applied.
Busirmess (Trnnditioyms
it is still too early to evaluate the imrrpact of the
freeze omr ecomiolinie activity’. Few data are available
simice the imrnpositiomr of time freeze, aird the clramrged
rules mnrake immterpretatiomi mrrore dhfficult thran usual.
Apparemrtly, total spemidimrg onmi gooohs and services
iras comrtinuedl ton expamidh at a relatively rapioi rate simrce
mnidh-August. Gomnsumirer outlay’s hrave beemn particularly
stronrg, especially for autommrobiles, even tinougir growtlr
imi incoirre sho~veoiwitir the freeze on wage imicreases.
Business spemidimig, which has beemi hamnpered b urn—
certaimrties tirat time miew programnr inevitably created,
has probably continued to rise at a relatively moderate
pace.
Production has also expanded since mnid-August, but
tire rise has beemi less than the imicrease in sales. Indus-
trial production rose at a 5.8 percent annual rate fromn
the depressed August level to October. Reflecting
the rise inn output, payroll emnnploymmrent rose at a 2.2
percemit rate fromrr August to Novemnrber.
Price olevelopmnents since the iurposition of the
freeze have also been favorable. Prices of xvholesale
imrdustrial comnnnodities anol wholesale farm products
ammd processed foods and feeds dechned froni August
to Noveurber, whniie consumner prices inched up at a
mnruchr slower pace than earlier. However, the standard
measmmres of prices probably overstate the anrount of
imrnprovemnent, since they niay not adequately reflect
clnamiges in quality or service.
Outlook
As 1971 ends, the pace of inflation is slowing, and
growth rates of production and employmnent are ac-
ceieratimrg. Baseol omi tine mmiomnrentumn of business devel-
opmnnemrtsamiol stabilization actions taken in 1971, the
outlook for 1972 is for contimiued progress in reducing
inflation and increasing real output and emnployment.
Deveiopmnremmts in 1972, especially later mi the year,
ivihi aiso he affected by stabilization actions taken
imr 1972.
Traditional monetary amid fiscal actiomrs will have a
mnrajonr imnnpact omi the course of ecomnomrnic deveiopmnents
in 1972. Emnrpiricai studies at this Bank indicate that
mmmomietarv developmnrents will irave stronger effects than
fiscal ohecisiomrs, but sounol mnronetary actions are facih—
tated by prudent fiscal programs.
Comitrols omn wages and prices, nnay contribute to a
diowmnwaroi adjustnnemit of inflatiomiary’ expectations,
simortemmimrg thre lags betweern tine traohitiomial actions and
their econonric impact. 1-Iowever, controls should be
treated as suppIemrrentary to sounol mnionetary’ and fiscal
policies, amrd because controls encroach on freedom
amnd reduce efficiency, it is desirable that they be
plrasedi out as quickly as possible.
Progress toward price stabihty and full emnployment
is likely to) accelerate imi 1972. However, it serves no
purpose to pretennd that there is a quick, easy and
eonstless cimre to) the ecomionnic disarray. The adverse
conseqmmences of tire uronetary and fiscal actions taken
in flnammcimig tine Vietmiamnn \Var and tire enlargedi Gov—
ernmnent welfare and other nondefense progranns in
tire 1965-68 period continue to weigin lreavily on the
Page 9FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS DECEMBER 1971
nation. Inflationary expectationnrs were built imp grad-
ually during this period, as timne. after timrre great
losses were experienced by those ivimo failed to
anticipate tire inflatiomi in their econnomnnic decisions.
These experiences are nont quickly forgotten. Many of
tine other curreirt economic prohnlemrns are a result of
the stuhbormnness of these imnflatiomnary’ expectations.
\Yith moderate momretary expansion, tire basic eco-
nonnic forces pusinimrg time eeonomnny to potential equi-
libmiimmn would probably be imiterfem’eol with least, amroi
experience indicates thrat progress toward reducing
inflation anoh unemnrpioy’mnnemnt woimlol lie enlramncedl in
1972. Neither full employment nor price stalnihity is
likely during the comimng year, but a basis wouloh lie
estainlisimeol to reacir tirese goals more quickly imm the
following years.
Conclusions
Inflatiomm, winicim megan in tine mniid—1960’s, iras been
a serious problemin in 1971. By tine amnonumnt of attention
devoted to tire prohiemn and tire actions taken, it can
probalnly lie connchmolcol tirat tine pmmlnlic imas unoleresti—
mated tire costs resulting from inflation anol the prob-
ienns of ehmnninating it.
The tramisition to a slower rate of price increase iras
involved costs. Total real pronohimct chrangeol little fronm
mid-1969 ton tire end of 1970, and has remained beionv
capacity levels in 1971. Yet, given tine strongly im-
bedded inflation, thre costs onf reducing it have been
mrroolerate as comupareol with previous attennpts at
arrestimng inflation. Tine nnilder appm’onacim, with its con-
tinuing costs spreaol over a longer period, however,
has imicreaseol public anxiety.
Ton irasten progress towarol full emnployment and
price stability’, the conmntry’ imas aoloptedi tine New
Econnomnic Programnr, with olirect conntrols over wages
amid! prices. Timis approach nray’ help speed up the
ohowinward adhjmmstmnemrt of price expectations, but ex-
perience inolicates that it immvolves risks, it is essential
thrat care he taken to avoid those mnnomietary and fiscal
actionns tirat are likely’ to reimnforce tile imnflationary
pressimres.
Moire rapid solution to tine problemrns of imnflation and
umnoherutihzationmn of resoimrces conmlol inc accomplished
my imrrprovimng tine mnarket systenr. Such actions might
immelude redimcing sulnsidies, tariffs and import quotas,
widening tine range of anti-trust laws to cover more
mnonoponlistic practices, ehmninatimng outdated building
restrietiomns and onther barriers to greater productivity,
imrnproving skills of workers amnol informnation on job
opemnings, amnol modifyimrg tine mninimnnimm wage laws in
time imnterest of iunprovimng job opponrtunities for the
inexperienced and inandicapped.
Progress has ineen made on the inflation problem.
Transitional costs incurred hi redimcing inflation are
alson receolimng. As lomig as total spenohng continues to
grow at a mnonderate rate, inontir time inflationn and time
capacity? imtilizationn proniniemnns will gradimahly lie solved
as tine effects of past nnaladjustnrents receole.
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